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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN J. SWEENEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAPPY VALLEY, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10259 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, HAPPY VALLEY, INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, John J. Sweeney, will be referred to in this 
21 1 Brief as "Sweeney"; the Respondent, Happy Valley, Inc., 
2i 
will be referred to as "Happy Valley". This is an action 
for an accounting, for a declaration of contractual rights 
and for injunctive relief, all of which were demanded of 
Happy Valley by Sweeney in the portion of his Complaint 
2~ Which went to trial, Count 1, second cause of action of the 
Second Amended Complaint. The contest between the par-20 
I ties arises out of a Contract dated August 8, 1957. j ) 
2 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Upon trial before the Court, without jury, in December 
1963, District Judge Faux entered Findings, Conclusions, 
and a Decree directing Happy Valley to render an accoun~ 
ing to Sweeney of gross proceeds received by Happy Valley 
in the sale of certain real properties, declaring Sweeney's 
rights in the 1957 Contract, and denying his claim for an 
injunction against Happy Valley (R. 211-221). In accord· 
ance with the Decree, Happy Valley has completed its ac· 
countings of gross proceeds of sales and has tendered t-0 
Sweeney the representative amounts due him thereunder 
(R. 223-229). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this Appeal, Sweeney apparently seeks a new trial 
by jury so that a jury may interpret the 1957 Contract and 
determine a proper accounting by Happy Valley thereon. 
Sweeney also asks of this Court a determination that 
the trial Court erred in its Findings that the Contract of 
the parties required an accounting by Happy Valley of 
"gross proceeds" as distinguished from "market value" of 
real property sales made. He further seeks herein a de 
novo review of issues of fact and law in the matter. 
It is the position of Happy Valley that the lower 
Court's determination of fact and law should be, in all re· 
spects, affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original Complaint of Sweeney, filed in August 
of 1962, demanded from Happy Valley and Owen W 
Bunker, C. Taylor Burton, and G. Kirk Graff, an account· 
s 
ing under the 1957 Contract, judgment against each of the 
named-defendants for the amounts which the accounting 
reflected, and a declaratory judgment of Sweeney's future 
rights under the Contract (R. 1-3). After Answer and 
discovery, Sweeney was permitted to file an Amended 
Complaint (R. 38-62) wherein it was demanded that the 
same defendants be required to render an accounting, judg-
ment, that said defendants be enjoined from making fu-
ture real property sales at prices less favorable than aver-
age on the general market, that the individual defendants 
be restrained from causing Happy Valley to further breach 
its contract with Sweeney, and for declaratory judgment of 
Sweeney's future rights under the Contract. 
After answer to that Compfaint was filed, (R. 177-
80), Sweeney, by new counsel, filed a Second Amended 
Complaint (R. 121-167) in May 1963, against the same de-
fendants, setting forth four Causes of Action, the Second 
Cause containing two counts. Pursuant to Motions of the 
defendants at the Law and Motion and Pre-trial Divisions 
of the lower Court, the Second Amended Complaint was 
dismissed as to the individual defendants with prejudice, 
and the same was also dismissed with prejudice with re-
spect to Happy Valley with the exception of Count 1, 
Second Cause (R. 175-6, 194-201). Sweeney does not allege 
in this appeal, error of the lower Court in the dismissal of 
his other claims as against Burton, Bunker, Graff and 
Happy Valley. 
Under Sweeney's remaining Count 1 of the Second 
Cause, it was demanded: 
I 
i 4 
(a) That "Happy Valley render a true and proper I 
accounting" of all sales under the 1957 Contract· i 
(R. 134) • Ii 
(b) That "judgment be entered against Happy! 
Valley for the amount shown by such accounting": I 
(R. 134-5). I 
(c) That Happy Valley be enjoined from makin" I 
further sales at prices less favorable than that avair I 
able in the general market; (R. 134). 
1 
( d) For an order declaring Sweeney's future 
rights under the Contract; 
1 The Pre-trial Order of September, 1963, defined the tri· I 
able issues as : I 
"* * * an action for an accounting, for de· I 
clarative relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff and 
for injunctive relief, all of which arises out of the 
* * * 1957 Agreement" (R. 195). 
Happy Valley cannot agree vvith the presentation of 
facts underlying Count 1, as set forth in the Sweeney Brief. 
That Statement, some 14 pages in length, contains erron· 
eous and misleading citations of fact, and is so intermingled 
with conclusions, innuendos and argument that it neither 
defines accurately the issues raised by the pleadings and 
developed at pre-trial conference nor reflects the record 
of facts presented to the trial Court. Accordingly, Happy 
Valley, pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P., submits the 
following Statement of Facts in the matter : 
l. On August 8, 1957, Happy Valley (as Firs! 
Party), and others, including Sweeney, a partnership, I 
a corporation, and individuals (as Second Party), en· 1 
tered into a written contract concerning the develop· . 
I 
I 
5 
ment of some 366 acres of land in the vicinity of Wil-
low Creek Country Club as now located at 8300 South 
and 2700 East, Salt Lake County (R. 237-241a). 
Sweeney has never been a stockholder, officer or di-
rector of Happy Valley, and has never made a mone-
tary contribution to or investment in Happy Valley, or 
its acquisitions (R. 1117). His repreS'entative shares 
in Second Party under the 1957 Contract was 31.8 per 
cent (R. 237). 
2. The Contract provided, inter alia, that Happy 
Valley would purchase under contract from third par-
ties the selected acreage and thereafter sell a portion 
to Willow Creek Country Club, a corporation to be 
organized by the interests in Second Party. It was 
further covenanted that the balance of the acreage, 
some 200 acres, would be developed and sold for resi-
dential purposes and, after deducting a prescribed ad-
justment factor, Second Party was to receive 25 per-
cent of the gross proceeds of such sales and Happy 
Valley was to receive 75 percent of such gross pro-
ceeds (R. 239-240). 
3. Under Paragraph 8 of the Contract, Sweeney's 
31.8 percent of Second Party entitled him to 7.95 per-
cent (not 7.75 percent as erroneously asserted on page 
4 of his Brief) of the gross proceeds of property sales 
(R. 241-254). Sweeney is, and has been since January 
of 1962, the sole survivor of the Second Party under 
the Contract, Happy Valley having acquired all other 
interests in Second Party (R. 212). 
6 
4. Owen W. Bunker, C. Taylor Burton and KlrR 
Graff were the original directors and stockholders of 
Happy Valley. Graff withdrew in both capacities in 
1961 (R. 321, 506). 
5. Subdivision planning and promotional sales 
activity were commenced by Happy Valley in 1957, but 
due to unforeseen difficulties with County planning 
agencies, subdivision plats were not completed, ap. 
proved and recorded until November, 1959 (R. 360· 
367, 1131-37). 
6. It was proposed under the 1957 Contract that I 
costs of acquiring the 366 acres as well as subdivision , 
and development expenses of the residential properties 
were to be substantially financed through proceeds 
from property sales within the development (R. 367). 
7. A series of unforeseen events in 1959and196~ 
placed demands, unanticipated by the Contract, upon 
Happy Valley for land payments and residential subdi-
vision costs (R. 366-70, 522-35). Those facts were: 
I 
(a) Sweeney, acting for Second Party, notified 
Happy Valley that Willow Creek Country Club re· I 
quired fee title to the property underlying the goU f 
course facilities. This was not envisioned by the 
1957 Contract (R. 534, 1145). 
(b) The market for the developed residential lo~ 
was completely inactive and expected sales did not 
materialize (R. 521, 1133-1140). 
(c) In addition to cash demands for street, sewer 
and other off-site improvements in the developed. 
subdivisions, extra improvements were required 01 
7 
Happy Valley to serve the Country Club (R. 1131-
1133). 
( d) Contract payments were, during this time, 
due from Happy Valley to original landowners and 
some of those had to be renegotiated because of the 
title needs of Willow Creek Country Club (R. 1145). 
8. To meet these unexpected financial obliga-
tions, Bunker, Burton and Graff in their individual 
capacities, made cash contributions to Happy Valley, 
but for which Happy Valley would not have met its 
accounts and obligations (R. 522, 528). In considera-
tion of such cash advancements, Happy Valley, in No-
vember, 1959, and May, 1961, sold and conveyed to 
Bunker, Burton and Graff a total of 96 improved lots. 
The stated, agreed and accepted gross proceeds re-
ceived by Happy Valley for said conveyances were 
$3,000.00 per lot. In determining the price to be paid 
Happy Valley by Bunker, Burton and Graff for each 
lot, the following was done by Happy Valley: 
(a) Real estate opinions were solicited by Happy 
Valley and received from land developers and build-
ers (Manford Shaw and Holmes and Jenson), a 
banker (William A. Myrick), and real estate ap-
praisers (Edward M. Ashton and Don Stahle) (Ex. 
8D-13D). 
(b) Individual lots were offered for sale on the 
open market between 1959 and 1962 at prices higher 
than $3,000.00. No sales were made. Although 
Happy Valley accepted deposits from four prospec-
tive lot buyers in 1958, on'ly one ripened into a bona 
fide sale and option prices on the other three were 
refunded because of subdivision changes (R. 377-
86, 529, 1140). 
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( c) Discounts in lot prices were offered to chaiier 
members of Willovv Creek Country Club, the dis-
count price being above $3,000.00. Sales could not , 
be made (Ex. 22). . 1 
( d) Sweeney did not want to buy any lots at 
$3,000.00 and did not offer to buy after they wer1 
plotted and available for sale (R. 1083, 1089-9~, 
1141). 
9. In September of 1962, Happy Valley sold ana 
conveyed four additional improved lots each to Burton 
and Bunker, the stated, agreed and accepted gross pro-
ceeds received by Happy Valley for such conveyance; 
1 
being $3,000.00 per lot. As in 1959 and 1961, Burton j 
and Bunker were, at the time of said conveyancei, 
directors of Happy Valley. 
10. In addition to the conveyances referred tn 
above, Happy Valley sold and conveyed other proper· i 
ties involved in the accounting: I 
(a) In January, 1962, Happy Valley sold and I 
conveyed to 25 Associates, Inc., and R. E. McCon· I 
aughy (each of whom held an interest in Secona 
Party) some 31 acres for residential purposes, the 
gross proceeds received by Happy _Val~ey therefo; I 
being the transfer of the respective mterests o, 
the grantees as part of Second Party in the 19iii 
Contract. Said interest constituted 50.9 percent 
of Second Party and had a reasonable cash value 
of $42,908.00 (R. 1152-3). j 
(b) In May 1962, Happy Valley sold and c~n· 1 
veyed to Estates, Inc., some 2.5 acres of land for I 
I 
residential purposes necessary to the completion 
of Willow Creek Subdivision No. 4 developed by 
Manford A. Shaw, which adjoined the Happy Val-
ley property on the south. The stated and ac-
cepted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley 
for this conveyance was the cost of completion 
by Shaw of off-site improvements, street, curb 
and gutter, adjacent to Lots owned by Happy Val-
ley in said subdivision, or $13,742.85 (R. 1161, 
1172). 
(c) In April 1959, Happy Valley conveyed a par-
cel 100 feet by 130 feet to Salt Lake Water Con-
servancy District as a well site and location for a 
pump house (said conveyance being made with 
the knowledge and acquiescence of Sweeney for 
the Second Party), as part of a program to pro-
vide water for Willow Creek Country Club (R. 
418-19). In April 1961, Happy Valley conveyed 
to Jessup a triangular shaped parcel (less than 
an acre) for the purpose of straightening an ir-
regular boundary. Happy Valley received no pro-
ceeds from either the Conservancy District or 
Jessup conveyances (R. 1156, 392, 418). 
(d) From 1961through1963, Happy Valley sold 
certain lots in Willow Creek Subdivision 1, 2, 3 
and 4 to third parties on def erred payment con-
tracts and otherwise. These transactions and the 
gross proceeds therefrom are not a matter of con-
test in the case. 
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11. When lot sales did not develop as contem. 
plated under the 1957 Contract, negotiations ensued 
between Happy Valley and Second Party with respect 
to the satisfaction and retirement of the latter's 25 
percent interest in gross proceeds (R. 1147-1155). By 
January 1962, Happy Valley had acquired all outstand-
ing interests of Second Party except for that of 
Sweeney, 7.95 percent (R. 421-22, 602-4). Prior to 
trial, Happy Valley tendered various accountings to 
Sweeney of the gross proceeds received from sales and 
conveyances of lots referred to in Paragraphs 8, 9 and 
10 ( d) of this Statement. During trial, Happy Valley 
tendered an accounting to Sweeney of the gross pro· 
ceeds received from the transactions set forth in Para· 
graphs lO(a) and (b) (R. 1152-3, 1162). Since Happy 
Valley received no proceeds from the conveyances re· 
f erred to in Paragraph 10 ( c) above, no accounting as 
to those transactions was or has been made. 
The trial Court, in review of the Complaint, the Pre-trial 
Order and opening statement of counsel, determined the 
issues as requiring a legal interpretation of the 1957 Con· 
tract and an equitable accounting and proceeded to try the 
matter without jury. After some ten days of trial and a 
view of the premises, the Court filed a Memorandum De-
cision ( R. 206-9) and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and a Decree (R. 211-21) in which it: 
were 
(a) Determined that Happy Valley and Sweeney 
separate contracting parties and rejected 
11 
Sweeney's contention that Happy Valley was a fiduci-
ary to Sweeney ( R. 206) . 
(b) Determined that the action was one for an 
accounting, for a declaration as to future rights under 
the 1957 Contract, and injunctive relief (R. 206). 
(c) Determined that the 1957 Contract required 
an accounting by Happy Valley to Sweeney of gross 
proceeds of sales and rejected Sweeney's theory that 
Happy Valley must account on the basis of "fair mar-
ket value" (retrospectively determined) of the proper-
ties sold ( R. 207) . 
( d) Determined that the gross proceeds test was 
binding on the parties under the 1957 Contract unless 
it was shown that Happy Valley, in making convey-
ances to the Directors, Bunker, Burton and Graff, was 
guilty of dishonest, unfair, unconscionable or over-
reaching conduct. In such event, an accounting would 
be required of Happy Valley on an equitable basis (R. 
207). 
( e) Determined that market value of the prop-
erties at the date of conveyance was relevant as one of 
the factors bearing upon the good faith of Happy Val-
ley in the transactions between it and its Directors (R. 
208). 
(f) Determined that Sweeney carried the burden 
of proof in showing that Happy Valley was not in good 
faith or that its conduct was unconscionable and dis-
honest in the lot sales to the Directors (R. 349, 207, 
216). 
12 
(g) Found the issues of good faith in favor of 
Happy Valley and against Sweeney in connection witli . 
I 
the lot sales from the Corporation to Bunker, Burtoa I 
and Graff (R. 215-16). 
(h) Found that Sweeney's expert witnesses on 
market value had been given "more than necessary in· I 
struction" by Sweeney, himself, "in the hope that they 
would reproduce his views" (R. 208). 
(i) Determined that the testimony of Happy 
Valley's witness, William A. Myrick, carried weight 
as a practical expression of whether Happy Valley's I:. 
conduct was reasonable and in good faith in the con· 
veyances to the Directors (R. 208). 
(j) Determined that the testimony of Happy 
Valley's witness, C. Francis Solomon, Jr., (to the effect I 
that the Happy Valley project had been promoted 
four or five years sooner than the market warranted) i 
was of substantial weight (R. 209). 
(k) Required Happy Valley to promptly account 
and pay to Sweeney 7.95 percent of the gross proceeds 
of the contested sales (R. 209). 
(1) Determined that the 1957 Contract imposes I 
no obligations on Happy Valley to develop the prem· 
ises on a time schedule and rejected Sweeney's con· 
tention that he was entitled to a veto over future sales 
by Happy Valley (R. 218). 
(m) Refused to enjoin Happy Valley froni 
otherwise selling property in the normal course of 
business (R. 218). 
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(n) Determined that each party should pay his 
own costs in the matter (R. 221). 
Thereafter, Ha PPY Valley tendered an accounting along 
with a money deposit with the Clerk of the Court (R. 223). 
Sweeney's Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions, Decree 
and, in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 230-4) was de-
nied by the trial Court (R. 242). 
From the Decree entered, Sweeney takes this Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
SWEENEY COMPLAINT, THE PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER, AND THE TESTIMONY, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING 
THAT SWEENEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
A JURY TRIAL. 
(1) The case is involved solely with matters of 
accounting and equitable relief under the 
1957 Contract. 
In Point I (A) of his Brief, Sweeney claims that the 
trial Court was in error in denying him a jury trial on the 
issues raised by the pleadings and the Pre-trial Order. His 
Brief is less than clear, however, in specifying the particu-
la1· issues as to which a jury trial is, as a matter of right, 
required. The remains of his Second Amended Complaint 
at the trial stage demanded : 
14 
(1) "That Happy Valley be ordered to render a 
true and proper accounting, including all • 
sales, * * * as required by said agree- , 
ment. 
(2) "That judgment be entered against Happy 
Valley * * * for the amount shown by 
such accounting * * * 
(3) "That the Court enter an order enjoining and 
restraining Happy Valley from conveying 
lands * * * subject to the agreement 
* * * 
(4) "That the Court enter an order enjoining and 
restraining Happy Valley from neglecting or 
refusing to carry out its obligations under the 
agreement. 
(5) "That judgment be entered declaring Plain· 
tiff's rights under the agreement, including his 
right to regular and complete accountings, his 
right to share in gross proceeds from future 
sales of lands * * *" (R. 134). 
Thus, it is a fair conclusion that Sweeney's Complaint 
alone, fixed the case as equitable in nature, and for which 
right of trial by jury does not exist. Norback v. Board of 
Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 
2d 339 (1934). The related questions of law, involving the 
interpretation of the 1957 Contract as to whether Sweeney 
was entitled to an accounting on "gross proceeds of sales" 
or "market value of the properties" or some other standard, 
as well as the issue of the good faith of Happy Valley in 
the sales to the Directors, were legal and factual issues 
appendent and ancillary to the accounting and injunctive 
actions. That the nub of the suit was for an accounting and 
l . 
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injunction, both equitable, is witnessed not only by Sween-
ey's Complaint, but also by the Pre-trial Order: 
"The Second Cause of Action is an action for 
an accounting, for declaratory relief as to the rights 
of the Plaintiff and for injunctive relief, all of 
which arises out of the * * * 1957 Agree-
ment" (R. 195). 
Such was the posture of the case, an accounting and 
injunction action, at the time of trial. 
(2) Breach of Contract by Happy Valley was 
not before the Court. 
Sweeney claims on appeal that the trial Court was 
"confused" as to the nature of the action because, it is 
argued, the gravamen of Count 1 of the Second Cause was 
Happy Valley's breach of the 1957 Contract (App. Br., pp. 
18, 22, 23, 29). Sweeney thus contends that since an action 
for breach of contract is one at law and not equity, the 
right of trial by jury was reserved in the suit (App. Br., 
p. 23) . The difficulty with Sweeney's argument, of course, 
is that the pleadings, the Pre-trial Order, the issues framed, 
and the Record all belie a breach of contract theory. 
To begin with, not one count of Sweeney's Complaint, 
Amended Complaint, or Second Amended Complaint re-
motely suggests or raises an ex contractu claim; nor does 
the prayer in any of the Complaints demand the payment 
of damages for breach of contract. Secondly, counsel for 
Plaintiff at the pre-trial conference did not propose as an 
issue Happy Valley's breach of the 1957 Contract, and the 
Pre-trial Order did not so much as insinuate that the re-
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maining Count 1 of the Second Cause involved the breach ' 
of contract. The trial Court was genuinely concerned with 
Sweeney's claim that the action was for breach of contract, •. 
even though such claim was not made until the first day ' 
of trial ( R. 260) . Of particular concern was the fact th;t I 
although counsel for Sweeney then argued a breach of 
1 
contract, he did not seek to recover damages occasioned by ! 
the breach. This caveat was not answered by Sweeney 
when queried by the Court. Hence, the trial Court drew 
the triable issue as: 
"THE COURT: I fail to see, in your prayer, 
in the pleadings - in your prayer - a contention 
that this is a breach of contract, and, certainly, 
Judge Hansen, in his pre-trial order, Page 2, 'The 
Second Cause of Action is an action for -' (read· 
ing) 
"I am going to proceed as though this were an ac· 
tion in equity for an accounting between the par· 
ties" (R. 267). 
* * * * * * 
"Now, with respect to the basis or claim - the 
standard - which I must use in determining 
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to relief on the 
basis of the pleadings and the pre-trial conference, 
I have rejected that this is an action of breach of 
contract. 
"I take the view that plaintiff comes here ap· 
pealing to equity. It is clear that, if there is fraud, 
deceit or over-reaching in what the seller has done 
so th~t a reasonable person would be shocked at the 
nature of their transaction, that equity will intei~ 
vene and require the defendant to make a fair an 
reasonable accounting of the sales made. 
' I 
I 
t ...._ 
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"Accordingly, it appears to me that, if plain-
tiff shows fraud, deceit, overreaching - possibly, 
unreasonable standards - in the sales that have 
been made, equity will require the seller to re-make 
the accountings on a reasonable basis; that one of 
the things that will be helpful to the court in de-
termining whether, under all the circumstances, the 
transactions were unreasonable to the point that 
equity will intervene, is fair market value" (R. 
348). 
The Pre-trial and trial Court's determination that the 
case was one for an accounting and injunction and not 
breach of contract was borne out by the testimony of 
Sweeney at the trial. The totality of that evidence was di-
rected to the question of whether Happy Valley had en-
gaged in unconscionable, inequitable, or fraudulent conduct 
in the lot conveyances to its Directors, so as to require an 
accounting upon a basis other than gross proceeds received 
from sales. It is worthy to note that although Finding of 
Fact No. 2 of the lower Court affirms that the suit was 
for an accounting, declaratory relief and injunctive relief 
(R. 212), Sweeney, in his Motion to Amend the Findings, 
registered no objection to it on that basis (R. 230). 
It is safe to say, therefore, from a survey of the case 
in its entirety, that the suit involved an accounting under 
the 1957 Contract and declaratory and injunctive relief, 
and did not encompass an action for breach of contract. 
Ergo, Sweeney has no standing now to claim denial of 
iury trial on the theory that such contract issue was before 
the trial Court. 
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(3) Under the issues thus defined, trial by jury 
was discretionary with the trial Court and 
not a matter of right. 
Simply drawn, the question to be put is whether an 
action for an accounting is of an equitable or legal nature. 
If it lies within equitable cognizance, a trial by jury is not 
required. Holland v. Wilson, 8 U. 2d 11, 327 P. 2d 250 
(1958); Norback v. Bd. of Directors of Church Ext. So· 
ciety, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 (1934). Sweeney, on pages 
19 and 20 of his Brief, argues that the suit is a legal rather , 
than an equitable accounting. In so doing, he ignores the 
hard core of decisions from this Court which, without ex-
ception, has treated actions for an accounting as equitable. 
Kimball v. McCormack, 70 Utah 189, 259 Pac. 331 (1926); 
Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926). The 
most recent holding in this regard is West v. West, 16 U. ! 
2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965) wherein this Court stated: 
"Inasmuch as this is a suit over an accounting 
in a partnership, it is a suit in equity and it is the 
responsibility of this Court to review questions of 
both law and fact." 
Sweeney argues further that because Count 1 demanded 
judgment for "the amount shown by such accounting" and 
because 78-21-1, U. C. A. 1953, accords a jury trial in a 
suit "for money claimed due upon contract," that the case 
is at law and not equity. The four corners of Sweeney's 
claim were squarely before this Court and rejected in Lane 
v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926) wherein the 
prayer for relief was : 
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"That Dastrup be required to account to Plain-
tiff for all moneys received by him under the afore-
said contract for the sale of said property, and that 
the Plaintiff have a decree against said Dastrup 
for any such sum as may upon an accounting be 
found due and payable to him." 
This Court through Gideon, C. J., determined the facts in 
Lane to present a case in equity: 
"This is an equitable action, and this Court is 
therefore required to examine the evidence to de-
termine whether the facts found are contrary to 
the weight of the evidence, keeping always in mind 
that a finding of a trial court upon conflicting evi-
dence will not be disturbed unless it is made to ap-
pear that the Court has misapplied proven facts or 
made findings clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence." 
See also Blake v. Amreihen, 36 N. E. 2d 797 (Ohio 
1941), wherein it was said: 
"The fact that this accounting may result in a 
money judgment against him does not change the 
action from equity to law entitling him to a jury 
trial." 
The fact that Sweeney's suit is founded upon the 1957 
Contract is no panacea to his present claim of riglht to jury 
trial, nor does it invoke the provisions of 78-21-1, U. C. A. 
1953. Such does not rob the suit of its equitable nature. 
What his argument fails to appreciate is that in practically 
every instance, an action for an accounting is grounded 
upon a contractual relationship between the parties. If the 
contractual relation were to automatically activate the con-
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ditions of 78:-21-1 so as to strip the suit of its equitable 
character, the concept of an equitable accounting would be 
gone. Once it is determined that equity jurisdiction a\. 
taches, the trial Court may also hear and resolve ancillary 
and subordinate questions of law within the equitable 
framework. The leading case of N orback v. Ed. of Direc· 
tors of Church Ext. Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 
( 1934), requires nothing less: 
"If the issues are equitable or the major issues 
to be resolved by an application of equity, the legal 
issues being merely subsidiary, the action should be 
regarded as equitable and the rules of equity apply." 
The pleadings, pre-trial Order and evidence of trial 
are all witness to the fact that Sweeney, under Count 1, 
demanded an accounting pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the 
1957 Contract. Stated in yet another fashion, Sweeney has 
asked for specific performance of that contractual provision. 
It is not open to argument in this State that a suit for 
specific performance is, by definition, equitable and not 
legal. Close v. Blumenthal, 11 U. 2d 51, 354 P. 2d 856 
(1960). Accordingly, the trial Court was correct in ruling 
that Sweeney did not have a right to trial by jury in the 
case. 
( 4) Complexity of the suit, alone, is sufficient to 
justify equitable rather than legal cogniz-
ance. 
The accounting action of Sweeney made necessary the 
inquiry, testimony, and evidence with respect to better than 
H . Y.11· 105 separate real estate fransactions between appy ' 
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Jey,. its Directors, and others. Each sale and the gross pro-
ceeds received therefrom was a separate transaction, hav-
ing taken place on different dates and representative of 
varying marketing conditions. Examination of evaluation 
witnesses on market value (as the latter related to the 
issue of good faith) was of necessity, lengthy. In such 
eases, the judicial process is served by the efficiency of a 
non-jury trial and the authority is substantial that the 
multiplicity of factual issues is, by itself, a basis for equity 
jurisdiction. Thus, in Jackson v. Gardner, 197 Wash. 276, 
84 P. 2d 992 (1938), the Supreme Court of Washington 
stated: 
"Manifestly the right of the parties could not 
be determined except by taking an accounting be-
tween them, and, as the transactions appeared by 
the pleadings extensive and varied, it necessarily 
involved a long and complicated accounting. It has 
long been the rule that these conditions alone justi-
fied the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of 
equity." 
The Washington Court continued : 
"Jurisdiction of equity in this class of cases 
had its rise in the inadequacy of the common-law 
remedy. A court of law sitting with a jury is not 
a tribunal constituted so as to try an action involv-
ing a long account and reach an accurate result. 
The jury has no adequate facilities for keeping rec-
ords of the several items going to make up the ac-
count, and the ordinary mind cannot keep them in 
memory. The result must necessarily be a verdict 
without adequate consideration of the matters in-
volved, resulting, oftener than otherwise, in rank 
injustice to one party or the other. 
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"We are satisfied that the court did not abuse 
its discretion in treating the case as one of equitable 
cognizance, triable without a jury." 
To the same effect is Sunset Pacifi;c Oil Company v. 
Clark, 171Wash.165, 17 P. 2d 879 (1933). If for no other 
reason than the complexity of facts, the trial Court in this 
case was justified in trying the matter before the equity 
side of the Court. 
(5) Authorities relied upon by Sweeney do not 
support a right to jury trial in this case. 
Some attention, but small, should be given to the cita-
tion of cases claimed in support of Sweeney's right to jury 
trial under Point I (A) of his Brief. 
It is said that the decision of this Court in Halloran· 
Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927) 
is to the effect that an accounting is a proceeding at law. 
A review of that case does not permit such a finding. In 
point of fact, this Court in Heath recognized the accounting 
aotion to constitute "an equi1Jable proceeding" but went on 
to say that since there existed a lack of mutuality of obli-
gation, equitable relief could not be granted. So far as the 
character of the action was concerned, however, Heath is 
clearly in line with the equity doctrine of West v. West, 16 
U. 2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965) and Lane v. Peterson, 68 
Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926). 
Sweeney also claims that Rule 38, U.R.C.P., guaran-
tees his right to trial by jury in this suit. The swift an-
swer to that argument is that Rule 38 does not grant or 
create any right whatsoever to a jury trial. Professor 
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Degnan, in his review of the Utah Law on the right to trial 
by jury, records the accurate view of the Rule: 
"It must be observed that the rule (Rule 38) 
seems carefully non-commital. It does not attempt 
to define the right which is to be preserved. It 
seems to go no further than to say that the right 
declared, if any, should be preserved." Degnan, 
Right to Jury Trial in Utah, 8 Utah Law Review 
109 (1962). 
Nor is the case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 
Utah 204, 225 P. 2d 739 (1950), cited in Sweeney's Brief, 
appropriately considered. That is so because the Complaint 
in Fairbanks sought recovery of damages for breach of 
contract, an element which divorces it as precedent in this 
Appeal. 
Finally, the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Dafry Queen V. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
44 (1962) is quoted extensively by Sweeney in an attempt 
to buttress his jury trial argument. While the rationale of 
that case may possess some abstract interest to the reader, 
it is of no precedent in any way binding upon this Court. 
It was established at an early date that the guarantees of 
the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution dis-
cussed in the Dairy Queen decision, do not apply to the 
courts of the several states. Walker v. Sauvi"nette, 92 U. S. 
90 (1875). Moreover, the right to trial by jury under the 
7th Amendment is not applicable to the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Snyder v. 
Mass., 291 U. S. 97 (1934). So far as the federal constitu-
tional law is concerned therefor, the sovereign states have 
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no obligation to follow the notions as to jur 
in the Dairy Queen case. Utah has establish 
stitutional precedent in that regard, West 
Lane v. Peterson, supra, Kirnball v. McC 
which does not fit with the Dairy Queen De 
accounting is a proceeding at law requiri 
Then too, the simplicity of facts in the Da 
sets it apart from the detailed issues befon 
in the case at bar. It is a fair presumptiOI 
Supreme Court would have taken a differ 
jury trial question had the facts therein b 
those now before this Court. 
On every front, Sweeney was not entit 
a trial by jury on the accounting, declarat< 
tive issues before the trial Court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRE< 
DETERMINATION THAT THE Bl 
PROVING THE LACK OF GOOD 
THE CONVEYANCES FROM HAPP' 
TO ITS DIRECTORS WAS WITH E 
(1) The burden of proof to show goo( 
with Happy Valley only if there 
iary relationship between it and 
Under Point I(B) of his Brief, Sween 
claim that Happy Valley (or its Director: 
party-defendants) should have carried the 
at the trial to show that the conveyances f 
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ation to its Directors, Bunker, Burton, and Graff, were not 
in bad faith, unconscionable, unfair or fraudulent. Such 
claim it is argued, is founded on the principle that directors 
owe a fiduciary duty to prove the fairness of their personal 
transactions with the corporation. The authorities cited by 
Sweeney verify, as a general proposition of law, that di-
rectors, as trustees, owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and its stockholders and by virtue thereof, have the re-
sponsibility of proving the fairness and adequacy of their 
individual bargains with the corporation. Glen Allen Min-
ing Co. v. Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 
(1931) ;Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117 Utah 530, 218 
P. 2d 274 (1950); 3 Fletcher on Corporations, §949 (Perm. 
Ed.); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939). 
While that legal precept is sound in principle, it is clearly 
inapplicable and irrelevant under the facts of the instant 
case. 
The fiduciary relation of which the cases speak is that 
of the directors of the corporation as trustees on the one 
hand, and the corporation or its stockholders as the cestui 
que trust on the other. Thus, in Pepper V. Litton, 308 U. 
S. 295, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939), relied upon by Sweeney, the 
action was brought by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, as the 
representative of the corporation, against the directors of 
the bankrupt company. A fiduciary association between 
the corporate directors and the trustee was found to attach. 
In Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117 Utah 530, 218 P. 2d 
27 4 ( l 950) , a derivative action was instituted by stock-
holders in behalf of a corporation against corporate offi-
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cers. Upon concluding that "a fiduciary relation exists be-
tween the Board of Directors and the stockholders'', this 
Court held that the directors had the burden of proof as 
to the fairness of their dealings with the corporaition. 
Again, in Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining 
Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 (1931), also relied upon in 
Sweeney's Brief, the corporation, itself, questioned the pro-
priety of the transactions of certain corporate officers. In 
passing upon the question of burden of proof, this Court 
said: 
"The authorities everywhere recognize the rule 
that, where a fiduciary relation is shown to exist, 
the burden is upon the fiduciary to show good faith 
and fair dealing in his relations with his cestui que 
trust." ( Emphas1is added.) 
In each of the cases cited by Sweeney, therefore, the 
suit was between the corporation (or its representative, 
such as a trustee in bankruptcy or a derivative stock· 
holder) on the one hand, and directors or officers of the 
corporation on the other. There is nothing magic about th( 
assignment of the burden of proof to the directors in sud 
cases to show good faith, it being merely a normal exten 
sion of the principle that where the fiduciary relationshiJ 
exists, the burden in evidencing tJhe adequacy of the trans 
action is upon the fiduciary. Perry v. McConkie, 1 U. 2( 
189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953). 
The burden of proof issue in the case at bar may no' 
be quickly framed: Does there exist a fiduciary relation 
ship between Happy Valley and Sweeney so as to pJac 
f 't upon the Corporation the burden to prove the good ai 
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of the corporate sales and conveyances to the Directors, 
Bunker, Burton and Graff? The answer is a negative one. 
There is no evidence in the record of this cause that would 
begin to support a finding that Happy Valley now stands 
or has stood in a fiduciary capacity to Sweeney. In all 
transactions and relations with the Corporation, Sweeney 
has been and is an independent contractor under the 1957 
Contract. At the outside, his status becomes one of a credi-
tor of Happy Valley upon a land sale being made by the 
latter. He comes no closer than that. It is manifest that 
there is no fiduciary relationship between a corporation 
and an independent contractor or a corporate creditor. As 
stated in Briggs v. Spalding, 141 U. S. 133, 35 L. Ed. 662 
(1890), as between contract creditors and a corporation, 
vis-a-vis, "the relationship is that of contract and not of 
trust". In Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 
(1926), this Court had before it analogous facts to the 
present case. Plaintiff, a contracting party with Defen-
dant, sought an accounting as to certain property transac-
tions carried out by Defendant, it being claimed that the 
accounting was improper because of the Defendant's fraud. 
Examining the burden of proof applicable in that case, this 
Court said: 
"The burden of proving the alleged fraud is 
upon him who asserts it; moreover, the fraud must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence." 
The trial Court left no uncertainty in defining the relation-
ship between Happy Valley and Sweeney: 
"* * * The parties here in this lawsuit are 
not joint adventurers. They are independent con-
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tractors; and I am required to determine the mean. 
ing, and so interpret their contract. 
"As I have stated, it is fundamental that this 
Court will not re-make the contract for the parties" 
(R. 346). 
Furthermore, in the Court's Conclusions of Law, it is 
provided in Paragraph 5: 
"The relationship between Plaintiff and Happy . 
Valley is a contractual one only, and is not a joint 
venture and is not a fiduciary relationship" (R 
233). 
Sweeney, in his Motion to Amend the Conclusions of Law, 
(R. 230-4) did not set out this Conclusion as error. 
There being no fiduciary relationship in the case, the 
doctrine and authorities upon which Sweeney depends have 
no application. But the argument of Sweeney in Point 
I ( B) of his Brief does not stop here. He seems to claim, 
in addition, that a fiduciary obligation is due from the 
Directors of Happy Valley to Sweeney (App. Br., pp. 32, 
33, 34, 38) . The fallacy of that argument is that the di· 1 
rectors are not parties to the accounting or to any aspect i 
of the litigation. Furthermore, it is an established rul.e of i 
law that there is no fiduciary relationship between d1rec· i 
tors of a corporation and contract creditors of the corpora· ! 
tion. Patterson v. Stewart, 41 Minn. 84, 42 N. W. 926 ; 
(1889). The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Webb V. Cash, '
1 
I 
35 Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. 1 ( 1926), said it this way: I 
"It is difficult to perceive upon what principle 
1 
a director of a corporation can be considered a 
trustee of its creditors. * * * he has no 
I 
0 I 
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contractual relation with the latter; he represents a 
distinct entity, the corporation and his relations to 
its creditors is exactly the same as the agent of an 
individual bears to creditors of such individuals; 
and it is not pretended that in the latter case the 
agent would be the trustee of the creditors of his 
principal * * * " 
The lower Court was correct in determining that the bur-
den rested with Sweeney in proving that the sales and con-
veyances from Happy Valley to Bunker, Burton and Graff 
were not in good faith so as to require a different account-
ing. 
Lastly, Sweeney takes time out in Point I (B) to ar-
gue the weight of the expert testimony on market value 
(App. Br., pp. 38-40). While such evidence has no direct 
or indirect connection with the burden of proof issue and 
is subject to a motion to strike, the following is a rebuttal 
to such collateral matter. Contrary to the notions of 
Sweeney's present counsel, it was clearly understood by the 
parties in the trial Court that testimony on market value 
was not received as independent evidence upon which the 
accounting of Happy Valley was to be predicated. Its ad-
missibility was of a more refined purpose, viz., as but one 
of a number of factors which the trial Court would weigh 
in determining whether the conveyances of Happy Valley 
to its Directors were unfair, unreasonable or unconscion-
able so as to require a different accounting. Most of the 
evaluation testimony was of an ex post facto nature. That 
is to say, the appraisal judgments were formed after the 
time, the legal effect of which was in question. The ap-
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praisal of William A. Myrick, made at the request of Hap. 
PY Valley Directors and prior to the time when the con. 
veyances were made, revealed a market value of $3,000.00 
per lot. The trial judge found Myrick's testimony to be of 
"practical" significance in the decision of what was fair 
and wise at the time the sales and conveyances were made 
to the Directors. 
Although this Court will review the evidence in an 
equity proceeding, it will not disturb the findings of the 
trial Court unless they are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence. Hart Bros. Music Co. v. Wood, 14 U. 2d 366, 
384 P. 2d 591 (1963); Nunley v. Walker, 13 U. 2d 105,; 
369 P. 2d 117 (1962). 
POINT III. 
T H E T R I A L COURT CONSIDERED AND 
MADE EXPRESS FINDINGS ON SWEENEY'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE 1957 CONTRACT FOR 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND SALE OF 
PROPERTY. 
In Point I (C) of Sweeney's Brief, it is asserted that 
the lower Court "refused to consider any testimony regard· 
ing the terms of the Contract with respect to the develop· 
ment of the properties and made no findings in reference 
to the rights of Appellant in respect thereto" (App. Br., 
pp. 40-1). Conspicuously, however, Sweeney fails to make 
reference in this phase of his Appeal to any testimony 
offered by him during the ten-day trial on such issue. , 
Sweeney had an obligation to present testimony in the trial 
I 
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Court in support of his theory in this regard, rather than 
proposing the same for the first time on appeal. Hamilton 
v. Salt Lake County Sewage Improvement Dist., 15 U. 2d 
216, 390 P. 2d 235 (1964). 
Contrary to the self-sustained assertions in Sweeney's 
Brief, the trial Court made the following express conclu-
sions regarding his rights under the Contract: 
"6. The Agreement of August 8, 1957 imposes 
no obligation on Happy Valley to develop or sel'l the 
premises on any time schedule and plaintiff has no 
right of veto over Happy Valley's actions with re-
gard thereto, save and except that plaintiff's prior 
consent is required in the event Happy Valley seeks 
to sell or develop said premises other than for resi-
dential purposes and a shopping center. 
"7. Plaintiff is not entitled to any injunctive 
relief as prayed." 
The answer to Sweeney's claim in Point l(C) is com-
plete by the statement that the lower Court did consider 
and interpret Sweeney's rights under the Contract and in-
corporated the same within the Decree. Reduced to more 
practical considerations, his claim is not that the trial 
Court did not find on the issue, but that the finding was 
not to his liking. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN REJECTING SWEENEY'S OFFER OF 
PROOF AS TO SALES OF OTHER PROPERTY. 
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(1) At the time of the proffer, there was no 
foundation as to the terms of the sales, the 
relationship of the buyer and seller and other 
factors necessary to determine comparabil-
ity. 
The opening sentence in Point I (D) of Sweeney's 
Brief is classic: 
"By the Court limiting the trial to a hearing of 
an equitable accounting at the outset of the trial, 
Appellant was very limited in the nature of the 
testimony which he could adduce. * * *" App. 
Br., p. 43). 
Under the broad daylight of the transcript made in 
this case, such a remark is ludicrous. Sweeney was given 
leave to call witnesses and present testimony in whatever 
order desired. Time and again, witnesses were called and 
' 
recalled out of turn by his counsel (R. 509, 537, 541, 578). I 
Sweeney was even permitted to employ (what he admitted· i 
ly called) "discovery" during the course of the trial (R. : 
339-41). 
The source for his statement above-quoted is not easily : 
ascertained. It cannot stem from the trial Court's refusal i 
to admit into evidence Sweeney's off er of proof (through 
1 
the testimony of Bunker) of certain sales (Nicolaides, , 
Prows, Inc., Johnson, Rowley, McKay, and Award Homes), 
and from the further pro ff er (through the testimony of 
Burton) of other sales (Gordon, Ferre, Manley, Gordon ; 
and Bush, and Dyson), because the ruling made by the · 
lower Court thereon is consistent with the decisional Jaw in 
te 
in 
3::S 
this jurisdiction. There is no doubt from the record that 
Sweeney made the proffer to evidence that such sales were 
comparable to the subject properties in litigation and rele-
vant in determining market value of the latter (R. 581-91). 
Counsel for S\~.reeney began his off er of proof by saying: 
"MR. HATCH: I have an offer of proof I 
would like to make, your Honor, and, if we could 
do this a little before trial in the morning, be a lot 
easier. 
"THE COURT: All right; are you going to 
make an offer of proof; why don't you put your 
witness on? 
"MR. HATCH : This, your Honor, merely re-
fers to the direct evidence of comparable sales which 
the Court has not permitted me to bring in. 
"THE COURT: Direct evidence of compara-
ble sales? 
"MR. HATCH: Yes; * * *" (R. 581-82). 
Upon objection, such offers of proof were refused be-
cause there was no foundation at that point from expert 
witnesses that the sales contained in the proffer were, in 
fact, comparable to the properties in litigation. The law 
is settled in this State that as a condition to the admissi-
bility of sales of collateral property, it must be evidenced 
by competent expert testimony that such sales, their loca-
tion, terms and parties are, in fact, of reasonable compari-
son with the property before the Court. State Road Comm. 
V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); 
Stnte of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953). 
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Absent such foundation, a sale is not admissible as direct 
evidence of market value. State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 
15 U. 2d 56, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964). Both Burton and 
Bunker testified as laymen, not as experts. It is difficult 
to perceive Sweeney's concern on the question, since the 
sales within the proffer were ultimately received by the 
Court as bearing on market value through subsequent ex-
pert witnesses of Sweeney and under his cross-examination 
of Happy Valley witnesses (R. 479, 482, 484, 485-91, 556-
563, 629, 631-40, 865-880, 1237-1241). 
Sweeney further argues that it was error not to re-
ceive evidence with respect to negotiations between Happy 
Valley and the Federal Government over tax liabilities on 
the properties sold by Happy Valley to the Directors. It is 
said that the lower Court foreclosed cross-examination of 
C. Taylor Burton as to appraisals (Ex. 8D-13D) obtained 
by the Directors and "used" in connection with "difficul-
ties with the Federal Government", in the re-evaluation of 
the lots under litigation for tax purposes (App. Br., p. 45-
6). While Appellant makes no reference to that portion of 
the Record wherein the cross-examination and error is said 
to have taken place, it is assumed, for purposes of this re-
buttal, that such is found at R. 1170. Sweeney's argument 
on this score is much more sophisticated than a fair read· 
ing of the Record allows. There is no evidence, as his con· 
tention would infer, that Happy Valley obtained the con· 
cerned appraisals for tax negotiation purposes. The testi· 
mony is all to the contrary. Mr. Burton at R. 371, indi· 
cated that such appraisals were merely "referred to" in 
.. 
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negotiation with federal tax personnel. But the cross-ex-
amination of Burton at R. 1170, of which Sweeney now 
complains, did not concern appraisal data at all. It was 
directed at the evaluation of 24 subdivision lots for the 
compromise of a tax liability: 
By Mr. Hatch for Sweeney: 
"Now, following the transfer of twenty-four 
lots in Subdivision 1 from the corporation to you 
and to the two directors of the corporation, did not 
the Federal Government for tax purposes, require 
that you re-evaluate those at a different figure?" 
(R. 1170). 
'I1here was clearly no foundation before the Court to sug-
gest that such a question was germane to the issues of mar-
ket value or good faith, and until such foundation was pre-
sented, the possible compromise of subsequent tax liabili-
ties was properly excluded as irrelevant. 2 Jones on Evi-
dence, 726, Sec. 390 (5th Ed., 1958). 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION THAT THE 1957 CON-
TRACT CALLED FOR AN ACCOUNTING 
BASED ON "GROSS PROCEEDS OF SALES." 
Point II of Sweeney's Brief argues that the trial Court 
failed to interpret properly the 1957 Contract between the 
parties in that it did not accept Sweeney's theory as to 
the basis for the accounting. Capsulized, that theory was 
two-fold: (1) that he is entitled to an accounting predi-
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cated upon the "fair market value of the property, at the 
time of the conveyance, as residential lots" and (2) thal 
any sale made is subject to his retrospective determinatior. 
of market value. Although Sweeney was willing to accepl 
an accounting on the Estates, Inc., transaction on the basis 
of gross proceeds rather than market value because gross 
proceeds yielded a larger return in that instance, his o\} 
jections to Happy Valley's accounting and request for de-
claratory and injunctive relief were fastened, in the main, 
to these two proposals. 
The 1957 Contract makes it crystal clear that Sweeney 
is wrong on both arguments. Paragraph 6 of the Contract 
expressly provides that the accounting is to be based upon 
gross proceeds of sales and not fair market value: 
"The gross proceeds of sales of all of such prop· 
erties sold for residential lots shall be divided intu 
two portions, one equal to seventy-five percent, 
(75%) and the other equal to twenty-five percent"• 
(R. 80). 
Whatever the gross proceeds of a particular sale con· 
summaited by Happy Valley is, Sweeney is entitled to an 
accounting of those proceeds and a tender of money from : 
Happy Valley of 7.95 percent thereof. So far as fair mar·. 
ket value of the property sold may be related to the gross 
proceeds received from the sale, all that the Contract fairly 
implies and imports is that Happy Valley transact the sales 
fairly, reasonably and in good faith. To that end, however, 
Happy Valley is free to exercise its own business judgment 
or - and such may be more or less than what Sweeney 
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3.nyone might later peg as market value. If Happy Valley 
consummates a sale for an amount in excess of a property's 
fair market value, Sweeney is entitled to 7.95 percent of 
the gross proceeds, nothing less. By the same mark, if a 
sale is made by Happy Valley and later determined to be 
less than fair market value, Sweeney is entitled to the 
same percentage of the gross proceeds of such sale, nothing 
more. The bitter goes with the sweet. To construe the 
1957 Contract as requiring a division between the parties 
on a basis other than gross proceeds would be to rewrite 
and reform the Agreement, a theory which not even 
Sweeney, to this time, has asserted. 
As to the second part of his argument, the Contract 
does not grant to him a right to concur in the terms or 
nature of sales made by Happy Valley. No clause entitles 
him to veto a transaction or to accept it on his conditions. 
Nor does the Contract in any degree afford him the luxury 
of a "second guess" as to whether a sale made by Happy 
\Talley was the right thing to do under the circumstances. 
The lower Court was of this conclusion (R. 218). 
The trademark of the gross proceeds test under the 
Contract is that sum received by the Corporation in the 
sale consummated and not the value of what it conveyed. 
To insure that the gross proceeds received by Happy Valley 
were fair and in good faith, the Court took evidence con-
cerning four categories of transactions, the accountings as 
to which Sweeney objected. Each is discussed in chrono-
logical order. 
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Lot sales to Directors. As set forth in the Statemenl 
of Facts, Happy Valley sold and conveyed numerous lots w 
its Directors, Burton, Bunker and Graff, at $3,000.00 per 
lot. Sweeney admitted at one point of the trial that hao 
the sales been consummated with third parties, he wou!O 
have been bound thereby and entitled to 7.95 percent of the 
gross proceeds (R. 345). That the sales were, in fact, made 
to the Directors of Happy Valley does not warrant a dif. 
ferent result since there is no fiduciary relationship b~ 
tween Happy Valley and Sweeney. 
Why did Happy Valley sell the lots to the Directors! 
The reasons were that the initial demands for cash on Hap· 
py Valley were far greater than anticipated, having been 
accelerated by requests from Willow Creek Country CM 
for fee title conveyance rather than on extended real estati 
contract as originally planned (R. 360, 365, 522, 532-o, 
1131-3, 1145). The lot sales program had not maiterializeu 
and there was no ready market for them at a price Jess 
than $3,000.00 (R. 366-70, 372-86, 514-28, 599, 1163-4). · 
Faced with an almost certainty that the project would fail 
if funds were not provided, the Directors bought .the Jo~ · 
themselves at a price fair and reasonable at the time. 
There is a plethora of evidence that the lot price of 
$3,000.00 was established not arbitrarily or collusively, but 
only after consideration of the foregoing factors and the • 
opinions of disinterested parties, i. e., William Myrick, 3 
banker; appraisers, Stahle, Nelson and Ashton; and real· 
tors and builders, Manford Shaw and Holmes (R. 1173-Si, 
Ex. 8D-13D). Sweeney's answer to this testimony came in 
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the form of retrospective appraisals of three individuals , 
Tucker, Teerlink and Kiepe. The testimony of each had 
the air of advocacy and, as the trial Court put it in its Mem-
orandum Decision, gave the impression: 
"That the witnesses had been given more than 
necessary instruction by Plaintiff himself in the 
hope that they would reproduce his views. I think 
I detected frustration in these witnesses attempting 
to develop for the Court the blueprint which Plain-
tiff himself had insisted upon, rather than giving 
a more spontaneous expression of comparative val-
ues which finally would have been more helpful to 
me. * * *" (R. 208). 
Mr. Kiepe, who had appraised the properties in 1959 
prior to retainment by Sweeney, initially evaluated the land 
at substantially less than $3,000.00 per lot. His 1962 and 
1963 appraisals of the same properties as of the 1959 date 
reflected V1alues five times the greater (Ex. lP, 38P, 22P). 
Of further interest was the fact that the Second Party, in-
cluding Sweeney, in May, 1960, equated $275,000.00 to the 
value of 75 lots in the subdivision, or $3,333.00 per lot (R. 
1095, Ex. 52D). Although Happy Valley offered to sell 
lots to Second Party at $3,000.00 (R. 1058, Ex. 42P), 
neither Second Party nor Sweeney, individually, accepted 
the offer. 
The trial Court found from these and other facts that 
the sales from Happy Valley to its Directors were not un-
fair, unreasonable, shocking, unconscionable or fraudulent 
(Findings 17-20, R. 215-16). It is the settled law of the 
case that those Findings will not be overturned by this 
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Court unless the same are found to be clearly in error. 
Hart Bros. Music Co. v. Wood, 14 U. 2d 366, 384 P. 2d 59! 
(1963); Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 U. 2d 30 I 
376 P. 2d 940 (1962); In re Drainage Area of Bear River, 
12 U. 2d 1, 361 P. 2d 407 (1961). 
Thirty-one acre sale to Second Party interests. Seem. 
ingly, Sweeney claims that Happy Valley was not entitleil 
to dispose of property covered by the 1957 Contract as un-
developed acreage. The position is fallacious. The Contract 
provides and the lower Court found that property could be 
sold "for residential lots" and not merely "as residential 
lots". The Contract does not condition a sale upon the ex· 
istence of subdivided lots, nor would it assume that an ac· 
counting thereon would be, as contended by Sweeney, pred· 
icated upon a de facto subdivision. 
The hard facts of the thirty-one acre sale are that the 
buyers or grantees were all members of and comprised • 
I 
50.9 percent of the Second Party under the 1957 Contract. 
Happy Valley, seller, then owned an additional 17.3 percent 
of the Second Party interest. Accordingly, the transaction 
was entered into and approved by 68.2 percent of Second 
Party. Nowhere does the 1957 Contract give Sweeney, by 
his minority interest, a veto power to thereby frustrate 
the intent of the majority of Second Party. 
Under the accounting, Sweeney was entitled to his 
h · rea· 7.95 percent of the computed gross proceeds, avmg a 
sonable cash value of $42,908.00. Such was the determina· 
tion of the trial Comli; (R. 213). 
i ...._ 
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Estates, Inc., transaction. The undisputed testimony 
and the stipulation of the parties shows that the costs of 
the off-site improvements which Estates, Inc., (through its 
principal officer, Manford A. Shaw) constructed for Hap-
py Valley properties in consideration of the 2% acre con-
veyance, were $13,762.85. That sum constituted the gross 
proceeds received by Happy Valley from the transaction. 
It is at this stage that the consistency and "good faith" of 
Sweeney is put to the rack. Under the testimony of 
Sweeney's own witnesses, the value of the 2% acres was 
$10,000.00. It turns out that in this instance, adherence to 
the "market value" test ($10,000.00) yields a lesser return 
to Sweeney than does the "gross proceeds" standard ($13,-
742.85). Finding such to be the case, Sweeney acknowl-
edged before the trial Court that he would accordingly ac-
cept an accounting on the Estates, Inc., transaction based 
on gross proceeds : 
"For the Estates, Inc., tract at the north end 
of Sub. 4, the defendant received improvements 
worth (according to Manford Shaw's stipulated 
testimony) $13,742.85. We would accept this as 
gross proceeds" (Para. 16, Sweeney's Tr. Br., p. 
10). 
On appeal, Sweeney has taken a slig1htly different 
stand than that in the lower Court (App. Br., p. 54). Hap-
py Valley, however, has tendered its accounting on the 
premise that yields the larger return to Sweeney, gross 
proceeds. 
Water Ccnservancy and Jessup transactions. Happy 
Valley, at an early stage in development, conveyed a well 
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site to the Salt Lake Water Conservancy District and later 
I 
an irregular parcel to Jessup. As to the former, the con. 
veyance was made in furtherance of Happy Valley's obliga. 
tion to furnish water for the Willow Creek Country Club, 
the chief negotiator for the Club being Mr. Sweeney. The 
property underlying the well site was not considered part 
of the residential development by the parties under the 
1957 Contract (R. 1108-9, Ex. 22P). The conveyance of the 
small triangular parcel to Mr. Jessup was realized for the 
purpose of establishing a stable boundary and property de-
scription for the greater Happy Valley holdings. 
The Corporation did not receive any proceeds or assets 
for either the well-site transaction or the Jessup convey· 
ance. The trial Court found, upon ample evidence, that said 
conveyances were made by Happy Valley in good faith and 
for the purpose of stabilizing the properties held for resi· 
dential purposes (Findings 10, 11, R. 214). Happy Valley 
has tendered no moneys to Sweeney representative of these 
transactions. The reason is elementary: 7.95 percent of 
nothing is nothing. 
Of course, Sweeney claims his "fair" share of these 
no-proceeds transactions. While demand for 7.95 percent 
of the fair market value of the two parcels was vigorous 
in the trial Court, his Brief on appeal barely touches the 
matter (App. Br., p. 54). The inconsistency of his ap· 
proach to these tracts is met by the incongruity of his theor· 
ies and arguments on the case in its entirety. 
Sweeney's arguments on the Contract can be won not 
f t . Th lower by interpretation, but only by re orma ion. e 
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Court ref used to rewrite the Contract and we respectfully 
submit that this Court should not do otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for Sweeney, in his Summary, lament of the 
"extreme difficult circumstances under which Appellant 
had to present his evidence". It is said that the trial in the 
• 
lower Court was frequently interrupted for "so-called voir 
dire examination" so as to bring it within the remarks of 
Henroid, C. J., in Bd. of Ed. of Salt Lake City v. Bothwell 
and Swaner Co., 16 U. 2d 341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965). Such 
an attack is unwise. True enough, counsel for both parties 
had their hand at voir dire examination from time to time 
during the trial and Sweeney's counsel even engaged in 
some discovery. But the suit was in equity for an account-
ing and injunctive relief, tried without a jury and in an 
informal atmosphere. Both parties were given substantial 
latitude in the mode of presenting their evidence. 
For that matter, Happy Valley has, itself, shouldered 
a few unusual burdens in this suit. One is that since the 
original Complaint was filed by Sweeney, three separate 
counsel have, at one stage or another, appeared in his be-
half to urge new and sometimes diverse claims. That is not 
to critique the conduct of such counsel in any way, for all 
I have been able lawyers. It is, nevertheless, a fact that 
Happy Valley has been put to the defense of its accounting 
and the case in a different manner by each appearance. 
Sweeney's Brief has, in substantial respects, been presented 
to this Court on Appeal as though the matter was on a de 
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novo hearing. Not once is reference made to specific erron 
claimed of the lower Court in the Findings, Conclusion1 
and Decree as entered. The Appeal is substantively defi. 
cient in that regard. 
Sweeney is not entitled to a jury trial on the account. 
ing or other equity issues. The accounting, as determineii 
by the trial Court, was proper and the Findings and Con-
clusions made with respect to the 1957 Contract should be, 
by this Court, in all respects affirmed and the case r~ 
mitted accordingly. 
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